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     Abstract 
 
Converting a conventional contract into an electronic 
equivalent that can be executed and enforced by 
computers is a challenging task.  The difficulties are 
caused by the ambiguities that the original human-
oriented text is likely to contain. The conversion process 
involves the conversion of the original text into 
mathematical notation. This paper discusses how 
standard conventional contracts can be described by 
means of Finite State Machines (FSMs). This 
mathematical description helps eliminate ambiguities 
from the original text before the contract is coded into a 
computer program. The paper describes how to map the 
rights and obligations extracted from the clauses of the 
contract into the states, transition and output functions, 
and input and output symbols of a FSM. The FSM 
representation can be used to guarantee that the clauses 
stipulated in the contract are observed when the contract 
is executed. The paper describes the middleware required 
for the enactment of the contract represented as a FSM. 
   
1. Introduction 
 
The concept and the use of contracts are not new to 
today’s society. Legal contracts can be traced back to 
ancient times [1]. There are records that indicate that legal 
contracts were used by the Mesopotamians circa 2300-
428 BC for selling and purchasing slaves, land, crops and 
for establishing partnerships between two or more land-
owners.  
Since hard-copy contracts have been used for a long 
time, we know how to write (for example in English), 
interpret and execute a conventional contract; 
unfortunately, contracts in the electronic world are not yet 
well understood. In particular, converting a conventional 
contract into an executable contract is not a trivial process. 
  Precisely we define a conventional contract as a 
document that stipulates the rights and obligations that 
two or more signatories agree to honour during their 
interactions.  
An executable contract (x-contract) is the electronic 
version of a conventional contract and is a piece of 
software meant to be executed by computer (with little or 
no human intervention) to monitor and enforce the rights 
and obligations of the signatories at run-time.  
The interest of this work is focussed on business 
contracts. We assume that business interactions between 
enterprises take place by means of the execution of inter-
enterprise business processes. Thus in our work the 
contracts are conceptually located between the interacting 
parties and meant to drive the execution of the inter-
enterprise business processes. Business processes vary in 
complexity from rather small such as the purchase of a 
book to rather complex such as the sharing of ATM cash 
machines between two or more banks.  We assume that a 
complex business process can always be decomposed into 
two or more business processes of lower complexity that 
perform specific and individual activities. This 
decomposition can be conducted several times until the 
complexity of the resulting sub-processes is manageable. 
This decomposition approach is of great relevance for 
the implementation of x-contracts. With x-contracts the 
interaction between the business partners can be thought 
as taking place through individual sub-processes that are 
regulated by individual sub-contracts. Naturally, each 
sub-contract contains only the rights and obligations to 
regulate the activities involved by the particular sub-
process. For example, two business partners might have a 
contract that contains two sub-contracts: one for 
processing purchase orders for perishable goods and a 
different sub-contract for tinned food. To execute a 
complete business contract a parent contract is given the 
information and the power to create, coordinate and 
terminate one or more instances of the same or different 
sub-contracts as needed. When an instance of a sub-
process is instantiated or terminated by the business 
partners, its corresponding electronic sub-contract is 
instantiated or terminated by the parent contract. In this 
paper we are concerned with sub-contracts only. Yet we 
can briefly mention that the parent contract can be 
realised as a workflow script that manages the set of finite 
 state machines that represent the set of sub-contracts that 
compose the whole contract. In the rest of this paper we 
refer to our sub-processes and sub-contracts simply as 
processes and contracts. 
       Before a conventional contract can be implemented, 
the contract clauses have to be described in a formal 
notation. There are several alternatives for describing 
contracts formally and several factors to be considered 
before choosing one of them. One of the crucial factors to 
be taken into account is the means that different 
alternatives offer for validating the correctness 
requirements of the contract. These correctness 
requirements are imposed by the contractual parties and 
meant to give a certain degree of assurance that the x-
contract will not run into unexpected situations.  We have 
found that Finite State Machines (FSMs) are quite 
adequate for describing contracts, and for validating their 
correctness properties.  
         The problem we are investigating can be described 
as follows: given a sub-contract that has been derived 
from a conventional contract how can it be described by 
FSMs? We are not investigating how to negotiate 
contracts over the Internet; we assume that the contract 
already exists. Our goal is to express it in FSMs, possibly, 
after editing the original text to correct ambiguities. 
Another aspect we investigate is what run-time 
infrastructure is required for monitoring and enforcement 
of x-contracts.  We addressed these issues in a previous 
paper [2]; this paper is an extended and revised version of 
the previous one.  
 
     The rest of this paper is organised as follows. We 
introduce the concepts of rights and obligation in Section 
2. In Section 3, we demonstrate, with the help of a rather 
simple yet illustrative contract, how rights and obligations 
can be represented with FSMs. Monitoring and 
enforcement of contracts is discussed in Section 4. In 
Section 5, we discuss contract ambiguities, contract 
validation and justify why we consider FSMs convenient 
for representing contracts formally. Section 6 provides the 
reader with a realistic business contract example 
represented as FSMs after being validated and corrected 
to eliminate its ambiguities. In Section 7, we discuss the 
middleware layer (B2Bobjects) we use for contract 
management. The similarities and dissimilarities between 
our research approach and other influential paradigms are 
discussed in Section 8. After drawing some conclusions, 
we close our discussion in Section 9.   
2. Rights and obligations in a contract 
 
      Each entry in a contract is called a term or a clause.  
The clauses of a contract stipulate how the signing parties 
are expected to behave. In other words, they list the rights 
and obligations of each signing party.  
      A right is an action that a signing entity can do if it 
wishes to. For example, a contract might stipulate that 
Alice, as a manager of enterprise E1, has the right to send 
an offer to sell to Bob, the manager of enterprise E2. 
      Because this is a right, it is up to Alice to send or not 
to send the offer to Bob; Bob need not be disappointed if 
he does not receive the offer. Similarly, an obligation can 
be defined as a duty that an entity is expected to perform. 
       A failure to perform such a duty means a breach of 
the contract. For example, a contract might stipulate that 
upon receiving an offer to sell from Alice, Bob has the 
obligation to reply to her with an OfferAccepted or 
OfferRejected message. 
      The rights and obligations stipulated in a contract can 
be abstracted and grouped into a set of Rights (R) and a 
set of Obligations (O). Let us assume that ME1 and ME2 
are the managers of enterprises E1 and E2 respectively. 
Likewise let us assume that enterprises E1 and E2 have a 
contract with each other signed by their managers. The 
sets of rights and obligations of this contract will be 
denoted by },...,,,,...,,{ 222
2
1
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1
1
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MEME RRRRRRR ! , and 
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MEME OOOOOOO ! ,  respectively. 
      The sets R and O indicate that the manager of 
enterprise E1 has agreed to honour m rights and p 
obligations. Similarly, the manager of enterprise E2 has 
agreed to honour n rights and q obligations. We assume 
that m, n, p and q are integers and equal or greater than 
zero. For example, R1
ME1 is a right expected to be 
honoured by the manager of enterprise E1, whereas R1
ME2 
is a right expected to be honoured by the manager of 
enterprise E2. Obviously, for a contract to make sense it 
should have at least one right or one obligation. Note that 
for the sake of simplicity, in this paper we discuss 
examples of contracts with only two contracting parties. 
However, all our concepts, models, and examples can be 
generalised to n parties as long as n"#$ is finite. 
      Note that the execution of a right or an obligation such 
as SendOfferAccepted will, at a lower level of abstraction, 
demand access to one or more objects such as files, 
databases and printers. A question that arises here is 
whether Alice and Bob have the right to access the objects 
affected by their operations. This is an issue of 
authentication and access control and falls out of the 
scope of this paper. We believe that at object level, rights 
to access resources can be implemented using Role-Based 
Access Control mechanisms [3].  
3. Description of contracts using FSMs 
      A finite state machine M is defined as the quintuple 
[S,I,Z,"%&"'(,  where },...,,{ 21 msssS ! , },...,,{ 21 niiiI ! and 
},...,,{ 21 pzzzZ ! are finite nonempty sets of states, input 
symbols and output symbols, respectively. SIS )*:%  is 
the transition function and ZIS )*:' is the output 
 function.  Informally, M describes an abstract system that 
stays in a given state until it receives an external stimulus. 
      When such stimulus is received, the system reacts by 
doing something (for example, sending an output signal) 
and then moves to a different state. Note that do 
something might mean do nothing in some circumstances 
and that the new state is not necessarily different from the 
previous. The behaviour of this abstract system matches 
the behaviour of a business contract. At a given time a 
contract can be at any of n possible states (states1, 
state2,…,staten).  If the contract is in a given stateq (for 
example, WaitingForOffer), there is a finite and well 
defined set of events (event1, event2 , …,eventm) that can 
affect the future behaviour of the contract. Examples of 
events are OffertRejected and OfferAccepted. The 
occurrence of eventi determines what objects (variables, 
files, database, etc.) within the system change their values, 
that is, the event determines to which new state the 
contract switches. Similarly, there is a finite and well 
defined set of operations (operation1 , operation2 ,…, 
operationm) that can be executed when the contract is in 
stateq. The eventi determines the operation to be executed. 
      Fig.1. shows the graphical representation we will use 
in the paper, where e and o stand for event and operation, 
respectively (a null operation will be represented by +,-"
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stateq state2
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1
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e
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m
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Fig. 1. FSM notations. 
 
      It follows that a contract can be represented as a set of 
FSMs, one for each contracting party, that interact with 
each other. The physical location of each FSM is 
irrelevant to the functionality of the contract and is 
decided at the time of implementation. Conceptually, we 
can assume that a FSM is located within each contracting 
party and that these FSMs communicate with each other 
through communication channels.        
3.1. Example of a simple contract 
       To show how the rights and obligations of a contract 
can be represented by means of FSMs we will now 
discuss a simplified version of a contract meant to be used 
by a purchaser and a supplier. The text of the contract is 
shown in Fig.2.  
 
1 Offer
1.1 The supplier may use his discretion to send offers to the 
purchaser.
1.2 The purchaser is entitled to accept or reject the offer, but he shall 
notify his decision to the supplier.
2 Commencement and completion
2.1 The contract shall start immediately upon signature.
2.2 The purchaser and the supplier shall terminate the x-contract 
immediately after reaching a deal for buying an item.
 
 
Fig.2. Simplified version of a contract. 
 
       To help follow the discussion, the rights and 
obligations of the purchaser and the rights and obligations 
of the supplier have been extracted from the contract, 
enumerated as
P
iR ,
P
iO , 
S
iR and 
S
iO respectively and 
grouped into the set of rights  },,{ 121
SPP RRRR !  and 
set of obligations },,,,{ 21321
SSPPP OOOOOO ! . The 
meaning of each right and obligation is described in Fig.3. 
 
Purchaser’s rights:
: Accept offers.
: Reject offers.
Purchaser’s obligations:
: Start the x-contract.
: Reply to offers.
: Terminate the x-contract.
Supplier’s rights:
: Send offers.
Supplier’s obligations:
: Start the x-contract.
: Terminate the x-contract.
PR1
PR2
PO1
PO2
PO3
sR1
S
O1
S
O2
 
 
Fig.3. Rights and Obligations of the contract 
signatories. 
 
The representation of this contract by means of FSMs 
is shown in Fig.4. In the figure, the number of each right 
and obligation together with its corresponding operation 
is shown on the arcs of the FSMs. We have to mention 
that the contract we are discussing here is rather simple 
and looks correct at a first glance, however, as an 
attentive reader would have noticed; it suffers from 
inconsistencies (this will be discussed at large in Section 
6). 
3.2. Contract templates  
In the business world, there is a family of 
applications where the contracting parties resort to fairly 
standardized contract templates which are offered ready 
to be filled in and signed. Examples of these templates are 
tenant agreements that are offered on the take-it-or-leave-
it basis which means that the clauses of the contract are 
not negotiable. 
 
  
 Offer received
!
x-contract signed
Start x-contract
Offer rejected   
Send rejected Offer rejected received
!
Offer accepted 
Send accepted,         End x-contract
Offer edited
Send offer
Offer accepted received
End x-contract
Waiting
for offer
Waiting
for 
response
x-contract signed
Start x-contract
Deal
Deciding
to buy
Deal
Editing
offer
Purchaser Supplier
PO1
PR2
PO2
PR1
PO2
PO3
SO1
sR1
SO2
 
 
Fig. 4. Representation of an ambiguous contract by 
means of FSMs. 
 
       As a second example we can mention a contract 
signed between auctioneers and bidders where the rules of 
the game are not negotiable but well established; thus a 
potential bidder either accepts them and signs the contract, 
or leaves. It is worth emphasizing that in these examples 
the contracting parties can negotiate the data to be written 
in the blanks of the template, but not the clauses. 
      We believe that for this family of applications it is 
possible to offer, possibly in return for a fee, ready to fill 
in and sign x-contracts. We can think of a Web place 
where standard English text templates are stored together 
with their x-contracts. Remotely contracting parties can 
then fill in the template that suits their requirements, sign 
it, pay for the service, plug it in their applications and 
enact the x-contract. 
4. Monitoring and enforcement 
   
      To reason about how the contractual rights and 
obligations can be monitored and enforced by FSMs, it is 
useful to look at the rights and obligations a contracting 
party has in a given state of the execution of the x-
contract. In terms of FSMs, this is equivalent to looking at 
the set of operations that can be executed when the FSM 
of the contractual party is in stateq. It is useful to classify 
this set into two subsets: the subset of operations the 
owner of the FSM has the right to perform and the subset 
of operations that person has the obligation to perform, 
},...,,{ 21 mooo  and },...,,{ 21 pmm ooo .. , respectively.  
     We consider an example involving a purchaser and a 
supplier. Let us say, the execution of the x-contract at the 
purchaser’s side is in state stateq (see Fig.5). Executing an 
operation from the subset },...,,{ 21 mooo means 
exercising a right given by the x-contract. Similarly, 
executing an operation from subset },...,,{ 21 pmm ooo ..  
means complying with the purchaser’s obligations. Since 
each operation io  is paired to an event ie , the operation 
io  can be executed only after the occurrence of ie . So, in 
stateq, ie  can be triggered by an operation performed 
internally within the purchaser’s enterprise, or by an 
operation performed externally within the supplier’s 
enterprise. For example, ie  might be deliberately 
triggered by the purchaser (for example, when the 
purchaser wishes to send a purchase order) or it can be 
triggered by a message received from the supplier (for 
example, when the supplier wishes to offer a new item to 
the purchaser). Exercising a right (obligation) operation at 
one side of the contract might or might not have an effect 
at the other side. This depends on what the x-contract 
stipulates. 
 
Supplier
supplier’s rights
purchaser’s rights
purchaser’s obligations
statem+1
em+1/om+1
Purchaser
states
statez ez/oz
ei/!
supplier’s obligations
state1
stateq state2
statem
e 1/o
1
e2/o2
e
m /o
m
…
statepstatem+2 …
em+2/om+2
ep/op
state1
e1/o1
 
 
Fig. 5. Interactions through rights and obligations. 
 
      The dashed line pointing from the pair 11 / oe  at the 
supplier’s side to the pair pp oe / at the purchaser’s side 
implies that in states the supplier has the right to execute 
the operation 1o . We are assuming that text of the original 
contract stipulates that the purchaser (being in stateq) has 
the obligation to execute operation po  upon receiving a 
notification event pe  of the execution of operation 1o  at 
the supplier’s side when the supplier is in states. A few 
such additional dependencies are shown in the figure.  
      With appropriate support from the underlying 
middleware (see Section 7), each FSM can be used to 
monitor and enforce the rights and obligations of its 
owner. Thus the supplier’s FSM will allow the supplier to 
execute only the operations he has the right to execute and 
nothing else. Likewise, the FSM enforces the supplier to 
 execute the operations he has the obligation to execute. 
The purchaser’s FSM works in a similar way. 
5. Ambiguities in contracts 
 
       As we briefly mentioned in Section 3.1, the contract 
shown in Fig.2, suffers from ambiguities; namely, it does 
not specify the duration within which the supplier must 
send an offer to the purchaser. Neither does it specify the 
duration within which the notification about rejecting or 
accepting the offer should be sent. The x-contract can still 
be implemented and enacted but the purchaser’s FSM will 
hang silently until the supplier decides to send an offer. If 
for some reason the supplier forgets to send his offer, the 
two FSMs will hang silently forever or until the purchaser 
or the supplier use another channel (for example a 
telephone) to investigate the problem. Omissions like 
these are common rather than exceptional in conventional 
contracts where humans rely on common sense to 
interpret and deal with them; unfortunately, in x-contracts 
this kind of omissions are not acceptable because they 
would drive an x-contract into undesirable situations; thus 
the implementer of the x-contract must detect and 
eliminate them before deploying the x-contract. This is 
where the validation tools supported by or offered by the 
formal notation chosen for representing the contract 
become extremely important. One of the motivations we 
had for choosing FSMs for representing contracts was that 
the contract represented as FSMs can be validated using 
the model checking tools that were originally developed 
for validating communication protocols. Once the 
contract is converted into FSMs   the implementer can use 
a model checker, such as Spin [4] to verify that the 
contract is free of undesirable ambiguities; technically 
speaking, the implementer can use the model checker to 
verify that the contract satisfies certain safety and liveness 
properties. The model checker used should have the 
means for validating general correctness properties such 
as absence of deadlock and infinite cycles, and also for 
validating specific correctness properties requested by the 
contracting parties. Results of the use of Spin for 
validating contracts have been reported in [5]. 
      A model checker, Spin for instance, would 
immediately detect that the contract of Fig.2, fails to 
reach a final state because it makes no progress when the 
supplier forgets to send his offer. A corrected version of 
the contract is shown in Fig.6.  
       The sets of rights and obligations extracted from the 
contract are },,{ 121
SPP RRRR ! and 
},,,,{ 21321
SSPPP OOOOOO ! respectively, and shown 
in Fig.7. The representation of this contract by means of 
FSM is shown in Fig.8.   
 
1     Offer
1.1  The supplier may use his discretion to send offers to the purchaser.
1.2  If no offer is sent within seven days after the signature of the x-contract, or after    
the latest rejected offer, the x-contract shall be terminated.
1.3  The purchaser is entitled to accept or reject the offer, but he shall notify his 
decision to the supplier within five days after the receipt of the offer.
2     Commencement and completion
2.1  The contract shall start immediately upon signature.
2.2  The purchaser and the supplier shall terminate the x-contract immediately after 
reaching a deal for buying an item.
 
 
Fig.6. Contract after correction. 
 
 
 
Purchaser’s rights:
: Accept offers.
: Reject offers.
Purchaser’s obligations:
: Start the x-contract.
: Reply to offers.
: Terminate the x-contract.
Supplier’s rights:
: Send offers.
Supplier’s obligations:
: Start the x-contract.
: Terminate the x-contract.
P
R1
P
R2
P
O1
P
O2
P
O3
s
R1
S
O1
S
O2
spond within 5 days after receipt of an offer.
 within 7 days after start of the x-contract.
 
 
Fig.7. Rights and Obligations after correcting the 
contract.  
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Fig. 8. Representation of a contract by means of FSMs. 
 
6. A realistic example of a business contract 
  
In this section we use a realistic example to illustrate 
how the rights and obligations stipulated in a contract can 
be represented by means of FSMs, we will borrow the 
contract template provided in the appendix of [6]. This 
template is meant to be filled in and used as a contract for 
the purchase and supply of goods in conventional 
business. We are borrowing this template because it 
contains all basic clauses (commencement, place purchase 
 order, delivery, payment, rejection, etc.) most real life 
contracts would have; and also because it raises the issue 
of ambiguities in conventional contracts.  As it appears in 
the original paper, the contract template contains several 
ambiguities. For example, the clause that deals with the 
rejection of goods does not specify when, after receiving 
an unsatisfactory item, the purchaser must reject the item 
so that he is entitled to receive a replacement or a refund. 
Nor does the clause specifies when, after receiving the 
rejected item, the supplier must send a replacement or a 
refund. Omissions like this would drive the x-contract 
into unexpected situations such as unreachability of 
certain states, thus they must be detected by the 
implementer at design stage, for example with the 
assistance of a model checker. We used Spin to check 
some correctness properties of the original version of our 
example. From among the most common correctness 
requirements of contracts of this type, we arbitrarily 
selected to validate that:  
 
1. There are no unreachable states in the contract. 
2. The contract is free from deadlocks. 
3. The contracting parties do not receive unsolicited 
responses.  
4. The delivery of e-goods cannot occur before 
receipt of correct payment.  
5. The supplier will not proceed with any 
transactions if the e-goods are not downloaded in 
time after receiving of the payment.  
6. The supplier will never reach a deal (end state) if 
a correct purchaser order (PO) has not been 
received, a correct payment has not been 
received or the e-goods have not been 
downloaded in time.  
7. The purchaser will never reach a deal (end state) 
if the goods cannot be downloaded after sending 
a correct payment, or the supplier fails to provide 
a satisfactory remedy after receiving a 
notification of rejection of the e-goods, from the 
purchaser. 
8. The purchaser will never infinitely often submit 
incorrect purchaser orders.  
 
Our validation work resulted in a new version of 
contract. This version is shown in Fig.9. And the rights 
and obligations of the purchaser and supplier extracted 
from the text of the contract are shown in Fig.10. 
      The representation of the contract of Fig.9, by means 
of FSMs is shown in Fig.11, and Fig.12. In the figures Ri 
and Oi correspond to the numbers used in Fig.10, to 
enumerate the rights and obligations of the purchaser and 
the supplier.  
      It is important to notice that what Fig.11, and Fig.12, 
show is only one, out of several, possible realisations of 
the contract shown in Fig.9. A given contract can have 
different FSM representations depending on what and 
where we want to monitor and enforce.  For instance, a 
purchaser’s obligation from our example can be 
represented in both the FSM of the purchaser and in the 
FSM of the supplier: the supplier’s FSM would detect if 
the purchaser fails to honour his obligation, whereas the 
purchaser’s FSM would remind his owner that he is about 
to breach the contract and wherever it is possible, execute 
automatically and on behalf of the purchaser, the 
operation needed to honour the obligation. This approach 
would make a contract a highly active entity; however, it 
results in complex FSMs and naturally, in complex 
implementations, as everything is represented and 
enforced twice. In the FSM representation shown in 
Fig.11, and Fig.12, we opted for simplicity, because of 
this, the obligations are represented in one FSM only; the 
result of this is that the FSMs do not actually enforce the 
contract they only monitor and detect when the contract is 
breached. The assumption here is that the FSMs notify the 
interested parties about the breach of contract they detect.    
 
 This Deed of Agreement is entered into as of the Effective Date identified below.
BETWEEN
[Name]                 AND:      [Name]
of [Address]                     of [Address]
(To be known as the (Supplier))   (To be known as the (Purchaser))
WHEREAS (Supplier) desires to enter into an agreement to supply (Purchaser) with [Item] 
(To be known as (e-goods) in this Agreement).
NOW IT IS HEREBY AGREED that (Supplier) and (Purchaser) shall enter into an agreement 
subject to the following terms and conditions:
1. Definitions and Interpretations
1.1 Price, Dollars or $ is a reference to the currency of the  
[Country].
1.2 All information (purchase order, payment, notifications, etc.), is to be sent 
electronically. 
1.3 This agreement is governed by [Country] law and the parties hereby agree to submit to 
the jurisdiction of the Courts of the [Country] with respect to this agreement.
2. Commencement and Completion
2.1 The commencement date is scheduled as [date].
2.2 The completion date is scheduled as [date].
2.3 The schedule may be modified by agreement as defined in Section 9.
3. Purchase Orders
3.1 The (Purchaser) shall follow the (Supplier) price lists.
3.2 The (Purchaser) shall present (Supplier) with a purchase order     for the provision 
of (E-goods) within 7 days of the commencement date.
3.3 The (Supplier) shall notify the (Purchaser) of acceptance or rejection of the 
purchase order within 7 days after the receipt of the purchase order.
3.4 If the purchase order is rejected, the (Purchaser) shall correct the purchase order 
within 14 days after the receipt of the notification.    
4. Delivery
4.1 The delivery of the (e-goods) is the responsibility of the (Purchaser). The 
(Supplier) shall keep the E-good available for downloading at the specified e-address for 
at least 14 days after sending notification of acceptance of payment. The (Purchaser) 
shall download the (e-goods) within this period of time.
5. Payment
5.1 The payment shall be sent in full to the (Supplier) within 7 days after receiving a 
notification of acceptance of the purchase order. 
5.2 The (Supplier) shall notify the (Purchaser) of acceptance or rejection of the payment 
within 7 days after the receipt of the payment.
6. E-goods rejection
6.1 If the (e-goods) do not comply with the order or the (Supplier) does not comply with 
any of the conditions, then the (Purchaser) is, at his/her sole discretion, entitled to
reject the (e-goods). 
6.2 The (Purchaser) shall either (a) notify the (Supplier), of acceptance of the (e-
goods), within 7 days after receiving them, or (b) return the (e-goods) to the 
(Supplier), within 7 days after receiving them.
7. Replacement and refund
7.1 The (Supplier) may use his/her discretion to replace the (e-goods) according to the 
invoice or refund any monies paid.  
7.2 The (Supplier) shall either (a) notify the (Purchaser) of refusal to replace or 
refund, within 14 days after the receipt of the rejected (E-goods), or (b) replace or 
refund any monies paid, within 14 days after the receipt of the rejected (e-goods).
7.3 In the case of a dispute in which the (Supplier) refuses to provide a requested 
replacement or refund by the (Purchaser) within 14 days of the (Purchaser) returning 
rejected (e-goods), then the Purchaser shall terminate the contract. 
8. Termination
8.1 If (Purchaser) or (Supplier), fail to carry out any of their obligations and duties 
under this agreement, the offended party shall terminate the contract.
9. Disputes
9.1 (Supplier) and (Purchaser) shall attempt to settle all disputes, claims or 
controversies arising under or in connection with the
agreement through consultation and negotiations in good faith and a spirit of mutual 
cooperation.
9.2(Supplier) and (Purchaser) shall provide electronic evidences about breaches of the e-
contract.
9.3 This method of determination of any dispute is without prejudice to the right of any 
party to have the matter judicially determined by
a [Country] Court of competent jurisdiction.
10. Amendment
10.1 This agreement may only be amended in writing signed by or on behalf of both 
parties.
E-SIGNATURES
In witness whereof (Supplier) and (Purchaser) have caused this agreement to be entered 
into by their duly authorized representatives as of the effective date written below.
Effective date of this agreement: [day] of [month] [year]
[E-signature]                         [E-signature]
[Person]                              [Person]
[Role]                                [Role]
E-address for Notices:
[E-address]                           [E-address]
 
Fig.9. A contract for the purchase and supply of e-
goods. 
Supplier’s obligations
O01: Notify Purchaser of acceptance or rejection of Purchase order within 7 days after receipt of purchase order.
O02: Notify Purchaser of acceptance or rejection of the payment within 7 days of the Supplier receiving it. 
O03: Place e-goods at e-address for 14 days after sending a notification of acceptance of payment.
O04: Either (a) Notify the Purchaser of rejection of a remedy request within 14 days after receipt of the rejected e-goods, or (b) 
provide a remedy within 14 days after receipt the rejected e-goods.
O05: Provide electronic evidences of breach of the e-contract.
O06: Terminate the x-contract if the Purchaser is in breach of contract. 
Supplier’s rights
R01: Reject or accept a purchase order. 
R02: Reject or accept a payment. 
R03: Either (a) Refuse to remedy within 14 days after receipt of the rejected e-goods, or (b) Accept to remedy within 14 days after 
receipt the rejected e-goods.
R04: Amend contract but only in agreement with the Purchaser.
Purchaser’s obligations
O01: Follow the supplier’s price lists.
O02: Present a purchase order within 7 days of the commencement date.
O03: Correct a Purchase order within 14 days after receipt of a notification of the first rejection of the Purchase order.
O04: Send full payment within 7 days after receiving notification of acceptance of purchase order.   
O05: Download the e-good/s within 14 days after the receipt of the acceptance of the payment.
O06: Send acceptance or rejection of e-goods within 7 days of receiving them.
O07: Provide electronic evidences of breach of e-contract.
O08: Terminate the x-contract if either (a) The Supplier is in breach of contract, or (b) In the case of a dispute where the Supplier does 
not provide replacement or remedy for rejected e-goods.  
Purchaser’s rights
R01: Reject e-goods that fail to match the description/requirement.
R02: Amend contract but only in agreement with the supplier.
 
Fig.10. Rights and obligations of signatories. 
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Fig. 11. Supplier’s FSM. 
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Fig. 12. Purchaser’s FSM. 
 
 
       Based on our own experiments we speculate that 
converting a contract into its x-contract will be a long and 
interactive process between the writer of the English text 
contract (for example, a lawyer) and the technical person 
in charge of the implementation of the x-contract. The 
technical person would receive the English text contract 
from the lawyer, convert it into FSMs and check it for 
ambiguities. Detection of ambiguities would mean 
bouncing the contract back to the lawyer for correction. 
       Only when both the lawyer and the technical person 
agree about the content of the English text contract and its 
 correctness, the technical person proceeds with its 
implementation. 
 
7. Middleware support 
      Next we investigate what middleware services are 
required to support a contract management system that 
guarantees that the rights and obligations stipulated in the 
contract are monitored and enforced. We are assuming 
that the organizations involved might not trust each other, 
so an important requirement from the middleware is that 
it should enable regulated interactions (as encoded in x-
contract) between two or more mutually distrusting but 
autonomous organizations. It is clearly not possible to 
prevent organisations from misbehaving and attempting to 
cheat on their agreed contractual relationships. The best 
that can be achieved is to ensure that all contractual 
interactions between such organisations are funnelled 
through (a centralised or distributed) contract 
management system and that all other non-contractual 
interactions are disallowed.  
      We assume that each organization has a local set of 
policies for business interactions that is consistent with 
the overall business interaction rules encoded in the form 
of rights and obligations in the x-contract. Then, the 
safety property of the contract management system should 
ensure that local policies of an organization are not 
compromised despite failures and/or misbehavior by other 
parties; whilst the liveness property should ensure that if 
all the parties are correct (not misbehaving), then agreed 
interactions would take place despite a bounded number 
of temporary network and computer related failures. 
      Given the above observations, we can state that 
organizations will require (i) that their own actions meet 
locally determined policies; and that these actions are 
acknowledged and accepted by other parties; and (ii) that 
the actions of other parties comply with agreed rules and 
are irrefutably attributable to those parties. These 
requirements imply the collection, and verification, of 
non-repudiable evidence of the actions of parties who 
interact with each other. 
      For non-repudiable information sharing we propose to 
use the B2BObject middleware developed by us [7]. 
Assume that every organization has a copy of some 
shared information encoded in objects, then B2Bobjects 
middleware provides non-repudiable coordination of the 
state of object replicas. State changes are subject to a 
locally evaluated validation process. State validation is 
application-specific and may be arbitrarily complex (and 
may involve back-end processes at each organisation). 
Coordination protocols provide multi-party agreement 
on access to and validation of state. Fig. 13 presents four 
enterprises (E1, E2, E3, E4), sharing a state through three 
B2BObjects (A, B, and C). As shown in the figure, the 
logical view of shared objects in a virtual space (a) is 
realised by the regulated coordination of actions on object 
replicas held at each organisation (b). 
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Fig. 13. B2Bobject Interactions. 
 
Multi-party validation of state changes supports the 
notion of “joint ownership” of shared state. A state 
change proposal comprises the new state and the 
proposer’s signature on that state. The proposal is 
dispatched to all other parties for local validation. Each 
recipient produces a response comprising a signed receipt 
and a signed decision on the (local) validity of the state 
change. All parties receive each response and a new state 
is valid if the collective decision is unanimous agreement 
to the change. The signing of evidence generated during 
state validation binds the evidence to the relevant key-
holder. Evidence is stored systematically in local non-
repudiation logs. The B2BObjects middleware provides 
both the liveness and safety properties stated earlier.   
With this background, we can hint at the overall 
implementation of an x-contract. The implementation of a 
x-contract that involves a purchaser and a supplier, is 
shown in Fig.14. Each party maintains a copy of the 
contract object, encoded as one or more B2BObjects 
(B2Bobj); operations on these objects are controlled by 
the contract FSMs. The dashed line that goes from the 
supplier to the purchaser shows what happens when the 
supplier sends an offer. When the offer is ready, the 
supplier invokes a send operation, and the supplier's FSM 
switches to its Waiting for response state and makes a 
SendOffer call to the local copy of a shared B2Bobj (that 
implements the operation). The local B2Bobj collects, and 
signs, evidence of the operation and requests coordination 
of the proposed update to its state with the purchaser's 
B2Bobj.   
The purchaser's B2Bobj verifies the evidence provided 
and makes an up-call to the purchaser's FSM to validate 
the B2Bobj operation. Upon receiving the up-call, the 
purchaser's FSM switches to the Deciding to buy state. 
The dashed line from the purchaser's FSM to the 
supplier's FSM shows how the purchaser's response is 
 transmitted to the supplier. The B2BObjects middleware 
ensures that all operations performed by the purchaser and 
the supplier are recorded and are non-repudiable. Thanks 
to this facility the purchaser of the example of Fig.12, can 
provide evidence, at a court for example, that he sent his 
payment within 7 days after receiving a notification of 
acceptance of his purchase order, even if the supplier 
denies receiving the payment. One of the major 
advantages of B2BObjects is that it ensures this without 
the need of involving centralized trusted third parties.  
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Fig. 14.  Architecture for implementing x-contracts. 
 
      Contract management must be made part of the 
business processes of the organizations involved. An 
organization’s business processes can be divided into two 
broad categories. The business processes that are internal 
to the organization and the ‘contract management 
processes’ that involve interactions with trading partners. 
A difficult problem is that of coordinating multiple 
workflows in a decentralised manner. Most commercial 
workflow systems are inherently centralised. A way out is 
to use a workflow system with decentralised coordination 
(e.g., [8]) for managing just the inter-organizational 
workflows. This is left as a topic for further investigation. 
8. Related work  
       Formal representation of business contracts has been 
identified as a crucial issue by several researchers. In this 
section we will summarise the essential ideas behind the 
works that we consider influential in this research field.  
    In the work of Milosevic et. al. [6] [9] [10] a contract is 
informally defined as a set of policy statements that 
specify constraints in terms of permissions, prohibitions 
and obligations for roles involved in the contract. A role 
(precisely, a role player) is an entity (for example a 
human being, machine, program, etc.) that can perform an 
action. Formally, each policy statement is specified in 
deontic logic constraints [9]. Thus each deontic constraint 
precisely defines the permissions, prohibitions, 
obligations, actions, and temporal and non-temporal 
conditions that a role needs to fulfil to satisfy an expected 
behaviour. 
    For example, a constraint can formally specify that, 
“Bob is obliged to deliver a box of chocolates to Alice’s 
desk every weekday except on Wednesdays for three 
years, between 9 and 9:15 am, commencing on the 1st of 
Jan 2004”. The expressiveness of deontic notation allows 
the contract designer to verify temporal and deontic 
inconsistencies in the contract. The authors of this 
approach argue that it is possible to build verification 
software to visually show that, Bob’s obligations do not 
overlap or conflict. Such verification mechanisms would 
easily detect a conflicting situation where Bob has to 
deliver a box of chocolates to Alice’s desk and to Claire’s 
who works miles away from Alice’s desk. Similarly, the 
verifier would detect that Bob is not obliged and 
prohibited to deliver chocolates to Alice during the same 
period of time.    
Another research work of relevance to ours is the 
EDEE system. EDEE provides a framework for 
representing, storing and enforcing business contracts 
[11]. In EDEE a contract is informally conceived as a set 
of provisions. In legal parlance, a provision is an 
arrangement in a legal document, thus in EDEE a 
provision specifies an obligation, prohibition, privilege or 
power (a privilege or power is equivalent to a right in our 
work). An example of a provision is “Alice is obliged to 
pay Bob 20 cents before 1st Jan 2004”. Central to EDEE is 
the concept of occurrence. An occurrence is a time-
delimited relationship between entities. It can be regarded 
as a participant-occurrence-role triple that contain the 
name of the participants of the occurrence, the name of 
the occurrence and the name of the roles involved in the 
occurrence.  An example of an occurrence that involves 
Alice (the payer) and Bob (the payee) is “Alice is paying 
Bob 20 cents on 31st Dec 2003.”  The formal specification 
of a contract in EDEE is obtained by translating the set of 
informal provisions derived from the clauses of the 
contract into a set of formal occurrences. Another basic 
concept in EDEE is query. A query is a request for items 
satisfying certain criteria (for example, “Payments 
performed by Alice before 31st Dec 2003”). At 
implementation level, the occurrences representing the 
 contract provisions are stored together with queries and 
new occurrences in an occurrence store in SQL views. 
Business operations invoked by the contractual parties 
are seen as occurrences intercepted and passed through 
the occurrence store where they are analysed to see if they 
satisfy the contractual occurrences associated with the 
operations. EDEE has been provided with some means for 
detecting contract inconsistencies. To detect overlap 
between queries (a set of occurrences being both 
prohibited and permitted, a set of occurrences being 
obliged and prohibited, etc.) the authors of EDEE rely on 
a locally implemented coverage-checking algorithms. 
Of relevance to our research is also the Ponder 
language [12]. Ponder is a declarative language that 
permits the specification of policies for managing a 
distributed system or contractual service level agreements 
between business partners. Ponder specifies policies in 
terms of obligations, permissions and prohibitions and 
provides means for defining roles and relationships. To 
detect and prevent policy conflicts such as conflict for a 
given resource or overlapping of duties, Ponder’s notation 
permits the specification of semantic constraints that limit 
the applicability of a given policy in accordance with 
person playing the role, time, or state of the system.  
A common pattern of the related works discussed 
above is that all of them rely on elaborate logical 
notations that include temporal constraints and role 
players in their parameters. The expectation is that this 
notation should be able to specify complete and arbitrarily 
complex business contracts (see Section 1) and detect all 
kind of inconsistencies. This generality is certainly 
desirable; however, because of the complexity of the 
problem it might be rather ambitious. We believe that our 
modular approach that consists in dividing complex 
contracts into individual sub-contracts that can be 
formally described and verified separately is more 
realistic for detecting contract ambiguities. A crucial point 
here is the identification of the different sources of 
possible inconsistencies in business contracts. In our 
business model enterprises that engage in contractual 
relationships are autonomous and wish to remain 
autonomous after signing a contract. Thus a signing 
enterprise has its own resources and local policies. In our 
view each contracting enterprise is a black box where 
private business processes represented as finite state 
machines, workflows or similar automaton, run. A private 
business process interacts with its external environment 
through the contract from time to time to influence the 
course of the shared inter-enterprise business process.   
    From this perspective, we can identify two fairly 
independent sources of contract inconsistencies:  
/ Internal enterprise policies conflicting with 
contractual clauses. 
/ Inconsistencies in the clauses of the contract. 
    It is our view that these two issues should be treated 
separately rather than encumbering a contract model with 
excessive notation (details, concepts and information) that 
might be extremely difficult to validate. Such a separation 
is not considered in the papers discussed above. To 
simplify the issue, in our work we draw a clear line 
between the two possible sources of ambiguities. In this 
paper we are concerned only with the second issue, 
namely, with the cooperative behaviour of business 
enterprises and not their internal structure. 
    It is worth mentioning that the use of finite state 
machines for representing such interactions has other 
supporters. For example, it has been proposed for Web 
services (Web service conversation language, WSCL [13]. 
Likewise we note that inter-organisation business 
interactions, PIPs (partner interface processes) as 
specified in Rosettanet industrial consortium [14] can also 
be represented as finite state machines. 
    In our business model each contracting enterprise has 
the privilege and responsibility of verifying that its 
internal policies do not conflict with the clauses of the 
contract. Similarly, each enterprise exercises its 
independence to choose the roles players that would 
invoke operations on the contract and provide them with a 
proper contract role player certificate (a cryptographic 
key for example). Consequently, it is the responsibility of 
each enterprise to prevent inconsistencies with role 
players such as duty overlapping, duty separation, etc.   
    In our contract model we intentionally leave the notion 
of role players out of the game. However, we assume they 
are authenticated by the contract management system 
before they are allowed to perform operations on the 
FSMs. It can be argued that our FSM model lacks 
expressiveness in comparison with the related works 
discussed above. However we do gain in simplicity; as we 
described in Section 5, this simplicity gives us the 
alternative of using standard of-the-shelf model checkers 
like Spin [4] to validate general safety and liveness 
properties of contracts, relatively easily.   
        Electronic contracts have also been studied by 
Naftaly Minsky and his research group [15] [16] [17], 
under the concept of Law-Governed Interaction (LGI). 
The LGI mechanism is a message exchange software 
layer that allows a group of distributed agents to interact 
over a communication medium, honouring a set of 
previously agreed upon rules. An agent is an entity, for 
example, a computer program, with means for sending 
and receiving messages. As the term agent suggests, 
agents act on behalf of their enterprises. In the LGI 
paradigm, a business to business interaction involves a set 
of private laws and one interaction law: the private laws 
are internal to each enterprise and regulate the activities 
of the agents while operating as representatives of their 
enterprises whereas the interaction law is public to the 
members of the group and regulates the interactions 
 between the enterprises. To draw an analogy between the 
LGI and our FSM paradigms, it is worth mentioning that 
the interaction law is actually the business contract that 
the agents are expected to honour when they interact with 
each other on behalf of their enterprises.  
       A law can be regarded as a set of rules. An example 
of a rule contained in a private law would be “Agent Ei 
can place purchase orders without the approval of the 
manager only for purchases not exceeding 5000 pounds.”   
      Laws are enforced by controllers which are trusted 
entities conceptually placed between each agents and the 
communication medium. Thus the private law LA to be 
honoured by agent A is enforced by controller CA while 
the private law LB to be honoured by agent B is enforced 
by controller CB. The law LAB that regulates the 
interaction between agent A and B is enforced by a 
mediator controller CAB which is conceived as working on 
behalf of a mediator agent that bridges the interactions 
between agents A and B. Every controller stores its law 
(formally represented as Prolog-like terms) and the 
current control state of its agent. When an event occurs 
(for example, “purchase order received”) the controller 
performs the corresponding operations stipulated in the 
laws (for instance, “send acknowledgement to business 
partner”, “notify the local manager”, etc.) to honour the 
private law, the interaction law, or both, and computes the 
new control state [17].  
       The LGI approach is similar to ours in that it suggests 
a separation of business to business laws from internal-to-
enterprises ones. Likewise, the job of the mediator 
controller closely resembles the job of the FSMs of our 
approach. To the best of our knowledge, the LGI group 
has no reported results about validation of the laws or 
about how the controllers collect non-repudiable evidence 
of the operations performed by their agents. 
 
9. Concluding Remarks 
 
Converting an existing standard contract written in 
English or other human languages into an x-contract is a 
challenging yet achievable task. The result of the task 
should be a computer program that, when executed, 
performs, monitors and enforces the business operations 
stipulated in the original human oriented document. The 
ambiguities that are normally present in human oriented 
contracts make the conversion a difficult process aimed at 
correcting such ambiguities without changing the main 
goal of the original text contract. To find ambiguities in 
the text contract it is strongly advisable to convert it into 
formal notation with means for validating the correctness 
of the contract; in this paper, we proposed the use of 
FMSs for formally representing x-contracts. From our 
own experience we have learnt that FSMs are a simple yet 
expressive model for describing, validating, and 
implementing x-contracts. We have illustrated our ideas 
with the help of two simple, yet practical examples of a 
business contract.   
In our ongoing work we are in the process of 
implementing x-contracts on top of the B2BObjects 
middleware service. B2BObjects is used to regulate the 
interaction between the contracting parties and to collect 
non-repudiable evidence of each of their actions. Using 
B2BObjects we can show that x-contracts can be 
monitored and enforced without requiring the 
involvement of independent trusted third parties.  
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